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Abstract
Face anti-spoofing (a.k.a presentation attack detection)
has drawn growing attention due to the high security de-
mand in face authentication systems. Existing CNN-based
approaches usually well recognize the spoofing faces when
training and testing spoofing samples display similar pat-
terns, but their performance would drop drastically on test-
ing spoofing faces of unseen scenes. In this paper, we try to
boost the generalizability and applicability of these methods
by designing a CNN model with two major novelties. First,
we propose a simple yet effective Total Pairwise Confusion
(TPC) loss for CNN training, which enhances the general-
izability of the learned Presentation Attack (PA) representa-
tions. Secondly, we incorporate a Fast Domain Adaptation
(FDA) component into the CNN model to alleviate negative
effects brought by domain changes. Besides, our proposed
model, which is named Generalizable Face Authentication
CNN (GFA-CNN), works in a multi-task manner, perform-
ing face anti-spoofing and face recognition simultaneously.
Experimental results show that GFA-CNN outperforms pre-
vious face anti-spoofing approaches and also well preserves
the identity information of input face images.
1. Introduction
Despite the recent noticeable advances, the security of
face recognition systems is still vulnerable to Presentation
Attacks (PA) with printed photos or replayed videos. To
counteract PA, face anti-spoofing [25, 19] is developed and
serves as a pre-step prior to face recognition.
Earlier face anti-spoofing approaches mainly adopt
handcrafted features, like LBP [8], HoG [16] and SURF
[5], to find the differences between live and spoofing faces.
In [27], CNN was used for face anti-spoofing for the
first time, with remarkable performance achieved in intra-
database tests. Following their work, a number of CNN-
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Figure 1: Our CNN framework works in a multi-task man-
ner, addressing face recognition and face anti-spoofing at
one shot. It leverages total pairwise confusion (TPC) loss
and fast domain adaption (FDA) to enhance the general-
izability of the learned Presentation Attack (PA) feature
and improve face anti-spoofing performance across differ-
ent scenes.
based methods have been proposed, almost all treating face
anti-spoofing as a binary (live vs. spoofing) classification
problem. However, given the enormous solution space of
CNN, these methods tend to suffer overfitting and poor gen-
eralizability to new PA patterns and environments. In this
work, we attempt to enable an anti-spoofing system to be
deployed in various environments, i.e. with good generaliz-
ability.
For CNN-based methods, an important clue to differen-
tiate live vs. spoofing faces is the spoof pattern, including
color distortion, moire´ pattern, shape deformation, spoofing
artifacts (e.g., reflection), etc. During CNN model train-
ing, strong patterns make more contributions, and the re-
sultant model is more discriminative for them. However, if
these patterns are absent in the testing data, the performance
would severely drop. The CNN-based methods tend to over-
fit to some strong spoof patterns and thus suffer poor gen-
eralizability [19]. Apart from overfitting, domain shift [18]
is also an important reason for the poor generalizability of
face anti-spoofing methods. A domain here refers to a cer-
tain environment where an image is acquisited, consisting
of various factors such as illumination, background, facial
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Figure 2: Architecture of proposed GFA-CNN. The whole network contains two branches. The face anti-spoofing branch
(upper) takes as input the domain-adaptive images transferred by FDA and optimized by TPC-loss and Anti-loss, while the
face recognition branch (bottom) takes the cropped face images as input and is trained by minimizing Recog-loss. The
structure settings are shown on top of each block, where “ID number” indicates the number of subjects involved in training.
The two branches share parameters during training.
appearance, camera type, etc. Considering the huge diver-
sity of real world environments, it is very common that dif-
ferent samples have different domains. For example, the
domains of two paper attacks may be quite different even in
case of the same face if reproduced with different pieces of
paper (e.g. glossy vs. rough paper). Such domain variance
may lead to distribution dissimilarity of different samples
in the feature space and cause the models to fail on new
domains.
Based on the above observations, we propose a new To-
tal Pairwise Confusion (TPC) loss to balance the contribu-
tions of all involved spoof patterns, and also employ a Fast
Domain Adaptation (FDA) model [11] to narrow the distri-
bution discrepancy of samples from different domains in the
feature space. We then obtain a Generalizable Face Authen-
tication CNN model, shorted as GFA-CNN. Different from
prior methods that take face anti-spoofing as a pre-step of
face authentication, our GFA-CNN works in a multi-task
manner, performing simultaneously face anti-spoofing and
face recognition, as shown in Fig. 1. Since the CNN lay-
ers of the two tasks share the same parameters, our model
works with high efficiency.
Extensive experiments on five popular benchmarks
for face anti-spoofing demonstrate the superiority of our
method over the state-of-the-arts. Our code and trained
models will be available upon acceptance. Our contribu-
tions are summarized as follows:
• We propose a Total Pairwise Confusion (TPC) loss to
effectively relieve the overfitting problems of CNN-
based face anti-spoofing models to dataset-specific
spoof patterns, which improves generalizability of face
anti-spoofing methods.
• We incorporate the Fast Domain Adaptation (FDA)
model to learn more robust Presentation Attack (PA)
representations, which reduces domain shift in the fea-
ture space.
• We develop a multi-task CNN model for face authen-
tication. Our GFA-CNN performs jointly face anti-
spoofing and face recognition.
2. Related Work
Most previous approaches for face anti-spoofing exploit
texture differences between live and spoofing faces with
pre-defined features such as LBP [8], HoG [16], and SURF
[5], which are subsequently fed to a supervised classifier
(e.g., SVM, LDA) for binary classification. However, such
handcrafted features are very sensitive to different illumi-
nation conditions, camera devices, specific identities, etc.
Though noticeable performance achieved under the intra-
dataset protocol, the sample from a different environment
may fail the model. In order to obtain features with better
generalizability, some approaches leverage temporal infor-
mation, e.g. making use of the spontaneous motions of the
live faces, such as eye-blinking [20] and lip motion [15].
Though these methods are effective against photo attacks,
they become vulnerable when attackers simulate these mo-
tions through a paper with eye/mouth positions cut.
Recently, deep learning based methods [27, 17] have
been proposed to address face anti-spoofing. They use
CNNs to learn highly discriminative representations by tak-
ing face anti-spoofing as a binary classification problem.
However, most of them easily suffer overfitting. Current
publicly available face anti-spoofing datasets are too lim-
ited to cover various potential spoofing types. A very re-
cent work [19] by Liu et al. leverages the depth map and
rPPG signal as auxiliary supervision to train CNN instead
of treating face anti-spoofing as a simple binary classifica-
tion problem in order to avoid overfitting. Another critical
issue for face anti-spoofing is domain shift. To bridge the
gap between training and testing domains, [17] generalizes
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Figure 3: Visualized comparison of the learned feature dis-
tribution w/ and w/o Ltpc. Without Ltpc, the feature distri-
bution is diverse and person-specific (left), while with Ltpc,
the feature distribution becomes compact and homogeneous
(right). l is the classification hyperplane. Best viewed in
color.
CNN to unknown conditions by minimizing the feature dis-
tribution dissimilarity across domains, i.e. minimizing the
Maximum Mean Discrepancy distance among representa-
tions.
To our best knowledge, almost all previous works take
face anti-spoofing as a pre-step prior to face recognition
and address it as a binary classification problem. Com-
pared with previous literature, we solve face anti-spoofing
and face recognition at one shot. A most related work to
ours is [23], which proposed a two-tier framework to en-
sure the authenticity of the user to the recognition system,
namely, monitoring whether the user has passed the biomet-
ric system as a live or spoofing one. It performs authenti-
cation based on fingerprint, palm vein print, face, etc., with
two separated tiers: the anti-spoofing is powered by CNN
learned representations while the recognition is based on
pre-defined handcrafted features like ORB points.
Different with [23], we build our GFA-CNN in a multi-
task manner, our framework can recognize the identity of
a given face, and meanwhile judge whether the face is a
live or spoofing one. It is worth mentioning that for face
recognition, our method achieves single-model accuracy up
to 97.1% on the LFW database [12], which is even compa-
rable to state-of-the-arts.
3. Generalizable Face Authentication CNN
3.1. Multi-Task Network Architecture
The proposed Generalizable Face Authentication CNN
(GFA-CNN) is able to jointly address face recognition and
face anti-spoofing in a mutual boosting way. The network
has two branches: the face anti-spoofing branch and the face
recognition branch. Each branch consists of 5 blocks of
CNN layers and 3 fully connected (FC) layers, and each
block contains 3 CNN layers. The parameters are shared
between these two branches. The face anti-spoofing branch
is trained by minimizing TPC loss and face anti-spoofing
loss (Anti-loss), while the face recognition branch is trained
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Figure 4: The contribution-balanced process of SSFs.
Darker color in the FC layer indicates a higher contribu-
tion to the classification while lighter color indicates lower.
Each grid represents an SSF. The trade-off game between
Ltpc and Lanti can balance the contributions of SSFs to the
final decision.
by optimizing face recognition loss (Recg-loss). The anti-
spoofing branch takes as input raw face images with back-
ground, while the recognition branch takes cropped faces as
input. Before fed to the face anti-spoofing branch, the train-
ing images are transferred to a target domain by a given
target-domain image. In testing phase, each query image
is transferred to the target domain and then propagated for-
ward the network.
The CNN blocks are structured the same with the convo-
lution part of VGG16. Before training, the CNN blocks are
first trained on the VGG-face dataset to obtain fundamental
weights for face recognition. The FC layers of face anti-
spoofing and face recognition branches have the same struc-
ture except for the output dimension of the last FC layer.
The face anti-spoofing branch takes 2 dimensions for the
last FC layer, while the dimensions of the last FC layer in
the face recognition branch depend on the number of sub-
jects involved in training. The overall objective function is
L = Lanti + λ1 ∗ Lid + λ2 ∗ Ltpc, (1)
where Lanti and Lrecg are the cross entropy losses for face
anti-spoofing and face recognition respectively, Ltpc is the
Total Pairwise Confusion (TPC) loss, and λ1 and λ2 are the
weighting parameters among different losses.
3.2. Total Pairwise Confusion Loss
In order to learn Presentation Attack (PA) representa-
tions that are adaptable to varying environment conditions,
we propose a novel Total Pairwise Confusion (TPC) loss.
Our inspiration comes from the pairwise confusion (PC)
loss [10] that tackles the overfitting issue in fine-grained vi-
sual classification by intentionally introducing confusion in
the feature activations. We modify their confusion imple-
mentation to make it applicable to the face anti-spoofing
task. Our TPC loss is defined as
Ltpc(xi, xj) =
M∑
i 6=j
||ψ(xi)− ψ(xj)||22, (2)
where xi and xj are two randomly selected images (sample
pair), M is the total number of sample pairs involved in
training and ψ(x) denotes the representations of the second
fully connected layer of the face anti-spoofing branch.
Our Ltpc differs from the original PC loss in two-fold: 1)
TPC loss minimizes the distribution distance of a random
sample pair from the training set, rather than the sample pair
from two different categories, to force CNN to learn slightly
less discriminative features. 2) We minimize the Euclidean
distance in the feature space while the original PC loss min-
imizes the distance in the probability space (output of soft-
max) to make samples in the same pair have a similar con-
ditional probability distribution.
Our modifications are based on below considerations: 1)
With face anti-spoofing taken as a binary classification is-
sue, confusion across categories would not excessively af-
fect the discriminability of the PA feature on differentiat-
ing live vs. spoofing samples. 2) Face samples related to
the same subject would usually cluster in the feature space,
and implementing confusion on all samples could compact
and homogenize the whole feature distribution (see Fig. 3),
thus benefiting generalization performance. 3) As a bi-
nary classification problem of simpler structure, regulariz-
ing the model within the feature space would be more useful
than imposing regularization within the output probabilistic
space.
Our Ltpc can effectively improve the generalizability of
PA representations. This can be understood as follows. Sup-
pose there are K components in the PA representations,
each corresponding to one spoof pattern, which is called
a Spoof-pattern Specific Feature (SSF) in this work. As
shown in Fig. 4, different SSFs contribute differently to the
final decision. If we define the feature for a live and a spoof-
ing sample as Fl = (f1l , f
2
l , ..., f
K
l ) and Fs = (f
1
s, f
2
s, ..., f
K
s ),
respectively, where fil is the ith SSF of the live sample and f
i
s
is the ith SSF of the spoofing sample. The SSFs are ranked
based on their importance to the classification of live vs.
spoofing. On one hand, Lanti aims to enlarge the distance
between Fl and Fs for better discrimination. On the other
hand, Ltpc attempts to narrow the difference between Fl and
Fs. As f1l/s contributes the most to the differentiation of
live and spoofing samples, it will be impaired the most by
Ltpc. However, the contributions of less important SSFs,
such as fK−1l/s and f
K
l/s, will be enhanced by Lanti to offset
the impaired discriminative ability. In this trade-off game,
the contributions of all SSFs tend to be equalized, meaning
more spoof patterns are involved in the decision rather than
just a couple of strong spoof patterns specific to the train-
ing set. This could effectively alleviate overfitting risks. If
some spoof patterns disappear in testing, a fair decision can
still be achieved by other patterns, ensuring CNN would not
overfit to some specific features.
3.3. Fast Domain Adaptation
Besides the proposed TPC loss that balances the contri-
bution of each spoof pattern, we also apply FDA to reduce
domain shift in the feature space to further improve the gen-
eralizability of our framework.
Generally, an image contains two components: content
and appearance [21]. The appearance information (e.g.,
colors, localised structures) makes up the style of images
from a certain domain and is mostly represented by features
in the bottom layers of CNN [13]. For face anti-spoofing,
the domain variance among face samples may introduce the
distribution dissimilarity in the feature space and hurt anti-
spoofing performance. Here, we employ the FDA to allevi-
ate negative effects brought by domain changes. The FDA
consists of an image transformation network f(·) that gen-
erates a synthetic image y from a given image x: y = f(x),
and a loss network ϕ(·) that computes content reconstruc-
tion loss Lcontent and domain reconstruction loss Ldomain.
Let ϕj(·) be the jth layer of ϕ(·) with the shape of Cj ×
Hj × Wj . The content reconstruction loss penalizes the
output image y when it deviates in content from the input
x. We thus minimize the Euclidean distance between the
feature representations of y and x:
Lcontent = 1
CjHjWj
||ϕj(y)− ϕj(x)||22. (3)
The domain reconstruction loss enables the output image
y to have the same domain with the target-domain image
yd. We then minimize the squared Frobenius norm of the
difference between the Gram matrices of y and yd:
Ldomain = 1
CjHjWj
||Gj(y)−Gj(yd)||2F . (4)
The Gram matrix is computed by reshaping ϕj into a ma-
trix κ, Gj = κκT /CjHjWj . Then the optimal image yˆ is
generated by solving the following objective function:
yˆ = argmin
P
(λcLcontent(y, x) + λsLdomain(y, yd)), (5)
where P is the optimal parameters of network f(·), x is the
content image, y = f(x), yd is the target-domain image,
and λc and λs are scalars. By solving Eqn. (5), x is trans-
ferred to yˆ, preserving the content of x with the domain of
yd.
Fig. 5 shows some of our domain transferred samples.
The target-domain image is sampled from the training data.
Detailed analysis on the feature diversity between domains
w/ and w/o FDA is provided in Sec. 4.2.
4. Experiments
4.1. Experimental Setup
Datasets. We evaluate GFA-CNN on five face anti-
spoofing benchmarks: CASIA-FASD [28], Replay-Attack
Live
samples 
Spoofing
samples 
Figure 5: Example results by FDA. The upper left and bot-
tom right images of the images in the middle column are the
target-domain images expected to be transferred. Images of
odd rows are from MSU-MFSD; images of even rows are
from Replay-Attack.
[8], MSU-MFSD [26], Oulu-NPU [7] and SiW [19].
CASIA-FASD and MSU-MFSD are small datasets, con-
taining 50 and 35 subjects, respectively. Oulu-NPU and
SiW are high-resolution databases published very recently.
Oulu-NPU contains 4 testing protocols: Protocol 1 evalu-
ates the environment condition variations; Protocol 2 exam-
ines the influences of different spoofing mediums; Protocol
3 estimates the effects of different input cameras; Proto-
col 4 considers all the challenges above. We conduct intra-
database tests on MSU-MFSD and Oulu-NPU, respectively.
Cross-database tests are performed between CASIA-FASD
vs. Replay-Attack and MSU-MFSD vs. Replay-Attack, re-
spectively. The face recognition performance is evaluated
on SiW, which contains 165 subjects with large variations
in poses, illumination, expressions (PIE), and different dis-
tances from subject to camera. The LFW, the most widely
used benchmark for face recognition, is also used to evalu-
ate the face recognition performance.
Implementation Details. The proposed GFA-CNN is im-
plemented with TensorFlow [1]. We use Adam optimizer
with a learning rate beginning at 0.0003 and decaying half
after every 2,000 steps. The batch size is set as 32. λ1
and λ2 in Eqn. (1) are set as 0.1 and 2.5e−5, respectively.
All experiments are performed according to the protocols
provided in the datasets. The CNN layers are pre-trained
on the VGG-face dataset [22]. For data balance, we triple
the live samples in the training set of CASIA-FASD, MSU-
MFSD and Replay-Attack with horizontal and vertical flip-
ping, while doubling the live samples in the training set of
SiW by just flipping horizontally.
Evaluation Metrics. We have two evaluation protocols,
intra-test and cross-test, which test samples from and not
from the domain of the training set, respectively. We report
our results with the following metrics. Intra-test evaluation:
TPC/FDA
Intra-Test Cross-Test
MFSD Replay MFSD→ Replay Replay→MFSD
− − 10.5 0.6 39.4 34.6
− + 11.2 0.6 36.3 38.3
+ − 6.4 0 28.5 26.6
+ + 8.3 0.3 25.8 23.5
Table 1: Ablation study (HTER %). +” means the corre-
sponding component is used, while -” indicates removing
the component. The numbers in bold are the best results.
Equal Error Rate (EER), Attack Presentation Classification
Error Rate (APCER), Bona Fide Presentation Classification
Error Rate (BPCER) and, ACER=(APCER+BPCER)/2.
Cross-test evaluation: HTER.
4.2. Ablation Study
We perform ablation analysis to reveal the role of TPC
loss and FDA in our framework. We retrain the proposed
network by adding/ablating TPC and FDA. As shown in
Tab. 1, if TPC is removed, the HTER of intra-test on MFSD
drops by 2.9% (w/ FDA) and 4.1% (w/o FDA), respectively.
Since Replay-Attack is usually free of severe overfitting, it
is reasonable to see the improved performance is not sig-
nificant when using FDA, 0.3% (w/ FDA) and 0.6% (w/o
FDA) on HTER.
For cross-test, if TPC is ablated, the HTER dramatically
decreases by over 10% for MFSD→ Replay1, and over 8%
for Replay → MFSD, no matter FDA is used or not. The
best cross-test result is achieved by using both TPC and
FDA, indicating FDA can further improve the generalizabil-
ity of the proposed method.
To evaluate the feature diversity between domains w/ and
w/o FDA, we calculate the feature divergence via symmet-
ric KL divergence. Similar to [21], we denote the mean
value of a channel from the feature embedding of CNN as
F . Given a Gaussian distribution of F , with mean µ and
variance σ2, the symmetric KL divergence of this channel
between domain A and B is
D(FA||FB) = KL(FA||FB) +KL(FB ||FA). (6)
KL(FA||FB) = log σA
σB
+
σ2A + (µA − µB)2
2µ2B
− 1
2
. (7)
Denote D(FiA||FiB) as the symmetric KL divergence of
the ith channel. Then the average feature divergence of the
layer is defined as
D(LA||LB) = 1
C
C∑
i=1
D(FiA||FiB), (8)
where C is the channel number of this layer. This metric
measures the distance between the feature distributions of
1The acronym ∗ →  means training on database ∗” and testing on
database ”.
Methods EER(%)
LBP + SVM baseline 14.7
DoG + LBP + SVM baseline 23.1
IDA + SVM [26] 8.58
Color LBP [3] 10.8
Color texture [4] 4.9
Color SURF [5] 2.2
GFA-CNN (ours) 7.5
Table 2: Intra-test results on MSU-MFSD. The numbers in
bold are the best results.
Prot. Methods APCER(%) BPCER (%) ACER (%)
CPqD 2.9 10.8 6.9
1 GRADIANT 1.3 12.5 6.9
GFA-CNN (ours) 2.5 8.9 5.7
MixedFASNet 9.7 2.5 6.1
2 GRADIANT 3.1 1.9 2.5
GFA-CNN (ours) 2.5 1.3 1.9
MixedFASNet 5.3 7.8 6.5
3 GRADIANT 2.6 5.0 3.8
GFA-CNN (ours) 4.3 7.1 5.7
Massy HNU 35.8 8.3 22.1
4 GRADIANT 5.0 15.0 10.0
GFA-CNN (ours) 7.4 10.4 8.9
Table 3: Intra-test results on the four protocols of Oulu-
NPU. The numbers in bold are the best results.
domain A and B. We calculate the feature divergence of
each layer in a CNN model for comparison. In particular,
we randomly select 5,000 face samples from MSU-MFSD
and Replay-Attack, respectively. Each dataset is considered
as one domain. These samples are then fed to a pre-trained
VGG16 [24] model to calculate the KL divergence at each
layer following Eqn. (8). The comparison results are shown
in Fig. 6. As can be seen, with the FDA, the feature diver-
gence between MSU-MFSD and Replay-Attack is signifi-
cantly reduced.
4.3. Face Anti-spoofing Evaluation
Intra-Test. We perform intra-test on MSU-MFSD and
Oulu-NPU. Tab. 2 shows the comparisons of our method
with other state-of-the-art methods on MSU-MFSD. For
Oulu-NPU, we refer to the face anti-spoofing competition
results in [2] and use the best two for each protocol for com-
parison. All results are reported in Tab. 3.
As shown in Tab. 2, GFA-CNN achieves the EER of
7.5%, ranking the 3rd among all the compared methods.
This result is satisfactory considering GFA-CNN is not de-
signed blindly to pursue high performance in the intra-
test setting. In our experiments, we find the proposed
TPC loss may slightly decrease the intra-test performance,
mainly because TPC loss impairs the contributions of sev-
Figure 6: Feature divergence comparison between MSU-
MFSD and Replay-Attack. The numbers on x-axis corre-
spond to the CNN layer of VGG16.
320 x 240 320 x 240 320 x 240
720x 480 720x 480
720x 1280 720x 1280
Figure 7: Results transferred by FDA with different res-
olutions. The top left image is the target-domain image.
For other images of each block, the left one is the original
image, and the right is the transferred image. The green
number located at the top left of each image indicates the
resolution.
eral strongest SSFs w.r.t the training datasets. The weaken-
ing of these dataset-specific features may in turn affect the
intra-test performance (however, they may improve the per-
formance in cross-test). According to Tab. 3, our method
achieves the lowest ACER in 3 out of 4 protocols. For the
most challenging protocol 4, we achieve the ACER of 8.9%,
which is 1.1% lower than the best performer.
Cross-Test. To demonstrate the strong generalizability
of GFA-CNN, we perform cross-test on CASIA-FASD,
Replay-Attack, and MSU-MFSD by comparing with other
state-of-the-arts. We adopt the most widely used cross-
test settings: CASIA-FASD vs. Replay-Attack and MSU-
MFSD vs. Replay-Attack, and report comparison results in
Tab. 4. As can be seen, GFA-CNN achieves the lowest
HTERs in cross-test: CASIA→ Replay, MFSD→ Replay
and Replay → MFSD. Especially for Replay → MFSD,
GFA-CNN reduces the cross-testing HTER by 8.3% com-
pared with the best state-of-the-art.
However, we also observe GFA-CNN has a relatively
worse HTER compared with the best method on Replay At-
tack → CASIA-FASD. This is probably due to the “qual-
ity degradation” by FDA when the resolution of a source-
domain image to be transferred is much higher than that
of the target-domain image. During the cross-testing on
Replay-Attack → CASIA-FASD, the target-domain image
is selected from Replay-Attack with a low-resolution of
320 × 240. However, CASIA-FASD contains quite a num-
Methods
Train Test Train Test Train Test Train Test
Average
CASIA Replay Replay CASIA MFSD Replay Replay MFSD
LBP [9] 47.0 39.6 45.5 45.8 44.5
LBP-TOP [9] 49.7 60.6 46.5 47.5 51.1
Motion [9] 50.2 47.9 - - 49.1
CNN [27] 48.5 45.5 37.1 48.6 44.9
Color LBP [6] 37.9 35.4 44.8 33.0 37.8
Color Tex. [6] 30.3 37.7 33.9 34.1 34.0
Color SURF [6] 26.9 23.2 29.7 31.8 27.9
Auxiliary [14] 27.6 28.4 - - 28.0
De-Spoof [19] 28.5 41.1 - - 34.8
GFA-CNN (ours) 21.4 34.3 25.8 23.5 26.3
Table 4: Cross-test results (HTER %) on CASIA-FASD, Replay-Attack, and MSU-MFSD. -” indicates the corresponding
result is unavailable. The numbers in bold are the best results.
Figure 8: Comparison of ROC curves of face verification
on (a) LFW and (b) SiW.
ber of images with high-resolution of 720 × 1280. Such a
“resolution gap” leads to a “quality degradation” of FDA,
as shown in the rightmost image in Fig. 7.
4.4. Face Recognition Evaluation
We further evaluate the face recognition performance
of our GFA-CNN on SiW and LFW. Since our method is
not targeted specifically at face recognition, we only adopt
VGG-16 as the baseline. On LFW, we follow the provided
protocol to perform testing. On SiW we use 90 subjects for
training and the other 75 subjects for testing, which is its
default data splitting. This dataset also provides a frontal
legacy face image corresponding to each subject. At the
testing phase, we select the legacy image w.r.t each subject
of the testing set as the gallery faces, and use all images
in the testing set (including both live and spoofing) as the
probe faces.
The ROC curves of face verification are shown in Fig. 8.
As can be observed, GFA-CNN achieves competitive results
to VGG16 on LFW, 97.1% and 97.6%, respectively. How-
ever, when testing on SiW, the declined accuracy of GFA-
CNN is much lower than that of VGG16: the accuracy of
GFA-CNN reduces by 4.5%, while VGG16 drops by 14%.
The degraded performance is mainly due to face reproduc-
tion by spoofing mediums, in which some of the finer facial
details might be lost. However, GFA-CNN still achieves
satisfactory performance compared with VGG16. This is
mainly because the face anti-spoofing and face recognition
tasks mutually enhance each other, making the representa-
tions learned for face recognition less sensitive to spoof pat-
terns.
4.5. Discussions on Multi-task Setting
In this subsection, we investigate how the multi-task
learning affects model performance for face anti-spoofing.
We retrain our model without the face recognition branch,
keep hyper-parameters unchanged and evaluate with the
same protocol as the GFA-CNN. From the experiments, we
observe the multi-task training slightly decreases the intra-
test performance of face anti-spoofing (dropping 2.5% and
0.3% on MSU-MFSD and Replay-Attack, respectively).
This is reasonable, since the single model learns to perform
two different tasks. However, two advantages are achieved
compared with the single task training. Firstly, the training
process becomes more stable with the Anti-loss decreasing
gradually, rather than dropping sharply after some steps by
single task training, suggesting multi-task setting can help
overcome overfitting. Secondly, as shown in Fig. 8, multi-
task training helps learn face representations less sensitive
to spoof patterns for face recognition. This mainly benefits
from sharing parameters in the convolutional layers, giving
more generic fusion features.
5. Conclusion
This paper presents a novel CNN model to jointly ad-
dress face recognition and face anti-spoofing in a mutual
boosting way. In order to learn more generalizable Pre-
sentation Attack (PA) representations for face anti-spoofing,
we propose a novel Total Pairwise Confusion (TPC) loss to
balance the contribution of each spoof pattern, preventing
the PA representations from overfitting to dataset-specific
spoof patterns. The Fast Domain Adaptation (FDA) is also
incorporated into our framework to reduce distribution dis-
similarity of face samples from different domains, further
enhancing the robustness of PA representations. Extensive
experiments on both face anti-spoofing and face recognition
datasets show that our GFA-CNN achieves not only superior
performance for face anti-spoofing on cross-tests, but also
high accuracy for face recognition.
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